Any effort to analyze the social roots of improvements in population health must consider the regions where more than four-fifths of the world's people live: Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Health and well-being vary most dramatically across the countries of the Global South. The quest to alleviate misery and deprivation in these countries is both most urgent and most frustrating.
Exploring the social roots of improved population health in the Global South inevitably involves a dialog with "development theory." Two apparently unconnected paradigmatic shifts have recently captured the attention of development scholars and are making inroads into policy. The "institutional turn" in growth theory has shifted attention from levels of investment and "getting prices right" to the historical processes that generate enduring rules, norms, and organizational structures.
1 The "capability approach," has provided new analytical foundations for both expanding the definition of development goals and defining the political processes that can legitimately prioritize this expanded set of goals.
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This chapter focuses on the intersection of development theory and population health. First, it explores the institutional and cultural roots of improvements in population health. This effort will be undertaken using the broad institutional-cultural approach to population health that characterizes the chapters that make up this volume. Cross-national comparisons of life expectancy and a set of case studies will be the empirical springboard.
Second, I hope to make a contribution to development theory. More specifically, I will advance the claim that an expanded institutional-cultural approach points us toward the possibility of integrating the "institutional turn" and the capability approach.
Arguments about Population Health and Development
In work on the Global South, theories of improved health and wellbeing have traditionally been seen as part of the general quest for improved material circumstances of living. This makes common sense. A large proportion of the roughly 5 billion people who live in the Global South cannot take the material necessities of life for granted. Given the harsh realities of material deprivation, it is natural to assume that improved wellbeing of all kinds is primarily a functions of increased real incomes.
Nonetheless, neglecting institutional changes whose role is distinct from the effects of increased incomes is a mistake. The evolution of population health debates in the North makes this clear.
In the North, the "McKeown thesis," put forward in a series of pioneering articles and in two very influential books, 3 argued that changes in living standards rather than improvements in health care were responsible for the historical improvement of longevity in Europe (see discussion in
Jenson chapter in this volume). According to Colgrove, "sophisticated analyses in the field of historical demography effectively overturned the
McKeown thesis in the early 1980s," as new data analysis indicated that
McKeown underestimated the importance of public health measures. 4 Yet,
McKeown continued to influence policy and, perhaps even more important, continued to influence it in a direction that McKeown may not have intended. In hindsight, McKeown's failure to "foreground the importance of politics, ideologies, states and institutions in producing the kind of societies that distribute their material wealth, food, and living standards in a healthenhancing way for all concerned" can be considered implicated in the "dismantlement" of redistributive public health policies. 5 As Jenson makes clear, the political dynamics are more complicated than McKeown's critics acknowledge. 6 Nonetheless, Szretzer's point remains well taken. Incomebased models lend themselves to the interpretation that "invisible economic forces" are responsible for improving welfare rather than "health-directed human agency."
The problem is not just the proclivity of policy makers (in both North and South) to conflate an emphasis on income growth with an endorsement of reliance on "invisible economic forces." Posing the choice as one of "living standards" versus "health-directed human agency," also leads to conflating "human agency" with deliberate modifications of policies, organizations, and resource allocations directly related to the delivery of healthcare. 7 Together, these two effects lead to neglect of precisely the kind of changes which I will argue are central: changes in institutions, culture, and social relations not normally considered part of "health policy" but likely to have profound long-term effects on population health.
When applied to the Global South, these arguments about the determinants of population health become arguments about development theory. Over the last half of the 20 th century, development theory has been profoundly transformed. The early "statist" version of the "development project" in the immediate post-World period floundered in the 1970's and 1980's, at least in Africa and Latin America. 8 A more strictly marketfocused version of development policies gained ascendance in the 1980's and remained dominant through the end of the century. 9 The new version, known as "the Washington consensus" or (by its detractors) as "neoliberalism," relied on civil society to constrain the state politically and "getting prices right" to produce growth and improve well-being. Most governments in the Global South (and to some degree multilateral institutions like the World Bank) understand the need for a broader set of policies focused more directly on well-being, but they remain mired in the intellectual and organizational legacies of prior paradigms. The nostalgic romance of "anti-development" provides no policy strategy.
Disillusionment is easily hijacked by the "fundamentalist" political agenda, which threatens to fill the vacuum created by contemporary development theory's failing charisma.
Fortunately, promising new perspectives are emerging that could serve to revitalize development theory. On the one hand, even when development is defined in terms of economic growth it is increasingly conceived of as the product of institutions rather than the accumulation of capital. 16 On the other hand, Amartya Sen's "capability approach" has provided new analytical foundations for a broad and flexible definition of development in which income growth is only one component. If these two approaches could be integrated, the result could have a significant impact on both policy and theory. on the set of institutions that define and enforce property rights. 22 Despite the important advance of recognizing that markets don't arise automatically but must be politically, socially, and culturally constructed and sustained, this narrower focus creates a danger. When employed by less sophisticated analysts or translated into policy, the "institutional turn" could devolve into simply a new way of saying that markets plus capital is sufficient for growth.
The institutional approach has also failed to contribute to the reconceptualization of the goals of development that would allow broader concepts of well-being to take a legitimate place alongside income growth.
Here, the capability approach offers an ideal complement. The capability approach has three main virtues. First, it is grounded, through Amartya As an analytically prudent philosopher, Sen has made only the most modest and general set of claims as to how the goal of "expanding human capabilities" might be reflected in specific organizational structures or policies. Since the potential range of capabilities is almost limitless, development aimed at expanding capabilities could be many different things.
Sen allocates the job of constraining the possibilities to informed, democratic, public deliberation, but even on the political side his main contribution is to argue compellingly that such deliberation can, in principle, order collective preferences. 24 As Stewart and Deneulin 25 have pointed out, specification of the appropriate scale and mechanisms for informed, democratic, public deliberation is left for others to figure out.
26
The disjunction between institutional theories of growth and the capability approach to development is all the more curious given obvious incentives for convergence. On the one hand, growth theorists increasingly emphasize the role of intangible assets (knowledge and ideas of various kinds) and "human capital" as key inputs to growth, suggesting that "capability enhancement" is a principal means to growth, as well as the primary goal of development. 27 At the same time, advocates of the institutional turn are increasingly focused on the causes and consequences of the kind of collective goal-setting that Sen puts at the center of the capability approach. Democracy is seen as a "meta-institution" promoting growth while the leaders of the institutional turn advance sophisticated institutional models of the "economic origins of democracy". 28 In short, development theory seems ripe for an institutional theory of development defined as capability expansion. A synthesis should have the potential to produce an approach to development theory that is more theoretically satisfying and more useful as a basis for formulating policy.
An analysis of the determinants of population health in the Global
South focused on cultural and institutional determinants is one way to broach the task of integration. Life expectancy is one of the most generally accepted operationalizations of core capabilities. In the discussion that follows, I will first take a broad statistical look at apparent determinants of general variations in population health, using life expectancy as a proxy. The point of this exercise is to argue that there are good empirical reasons to believe that cultural and institutional factors must be analyzed along with material circumstances in order to understand these If we return to focusing on systematic differences rather than outliers, Yet, when we look at the scattergram, it is clear that there is a great deal going on here besides variation in income. If we look at countries with very low incomes -less than US$3,000 PPP GDP per capita -they cover almost the full range of life expectancy from around 33 in Zambia to 74 for Georgia. If we look at countries in which life spans are relatively longabove 65, they cover almost the full range of incomes from about US$1,000 PPP GDP in Tajikistan to over US$12,000 in Saudi Arabia. Insofar as these societies are expanding general access to knowledge, it is plausible that they are also more likely to support other forms of capability expansion, even if these other forms of support are not easily captured by available international statistics.
Education is also interesting because it is probably the best proxy for the other face of capabilities: their mutually reinforcing instrumental role in securing both income and well-being. More specifically, conceived of as a proxy for "human capital," education is almost universally acknowledged to be one of the most important drivers of income growth. 36 Increased incomes are a byproduct of capability expansion as well as a contributor to it. In this vision, a statistical connection between education and life expectancy demonstrates how one set of capabilities (access to knowledge) helps improve another set of capabilities (a long and healthy life). ).
Nonetheless, if one is content with rudimentary analysis, it is possible to look at the relation between inequality and longevity in poor countries as well as the relation between education and longevity in these countries.
Like education levels, inequality levels should be thought of as a summary result which reflects a broad set of social structural, cultural and political dynamics. As suggested by Wilkinson, lower Gini indices reflect a larger complex of cultural and institutional structures -those that reduce social hierarchy. 43 The social forces that reduce hierarchy may take many 40 Wilkinson and Pickett, "Income inequality and population health," 11. 2. The "Societal Support Index" is the sum of a proxy for social provision of access to knowledge (education index, which ranges from 0 to 1) and a proxy for reductions in social hierarchy (1 -gini index/100, which ranges from 0 to 1). See Appendix C for more detail on these variables.
None of this suggests abandoning income as a statistical (or conceptual) predictor of population health. The point is to suggest that complementary conceptual frames for thinking about the foundations of population health may be equally plausible, even when the contest is played out on the (far from level) playing field of cross-national regressions. In short, these results encourage us to examine case studies in the hope of further illuminating the ways in which supportive social policy might combine with mobilization to improve health-plus outcomes.
Institutions, Culture and Improved Health Outcomes in Poor Countries:
Having made an excursion into the world of cross-national statistical variation it is time to return to cases. My five cases have already been The key missing capacity in famines is more political than administrative. Effective political institutions ensure that public authorities will be aware that traumatic, potentially tragic dislocations of the economic processes which normally allow citizens to obtain food have taken place.
Even more important, political institutions motivate authorities to respond.
Once the governing apparatus is informed and motivated, the administrative capacity required to ensure the delivery of temporary food supplies is within reach of even the most primitive contemporary government.
In an even modestly effective democratic system, failure to respond to exceptional distress is damning. Consequently, the transition from colonial rule to local rule is perhaps the single most important historical factor leading to the diminished prevalence of famine. Sen 50 makes this point by contrasting the Bengal famine of 1943 when the colonial administration allowed at least 2 million people to starve to death with post-independence periods of crop failure in which famine was consistently avoided. 51 Of course, independent governments can also lack the political institutions necessary for responsiveness and accountability. Humiliated lower-caste peons were given scripts in which they were heroic rather than despised, in which they were supposed to exercise agency rather than hoping for charity, and in which their neighbors were comrades in a collective endeavor rather than competitors for scarce resources. Everything we know about the psycho-social correlates of improved health suggests that this would make a difference.
Finally, another relatively unexplored dimension of the Kerala case is the micro-character of the state apparatus itself. While most of the incumbents in the Kerala bureaucracy are Indian civil service types indistinguishable from those in other Indian states, at least some of them are themselves products of the very process of mobilization and social transformation that they are supporting. Do their own identities and "collective narratives" make a difference to the interaction of the state and civil society? One suspects that they must, and a very disparate case from the other side of the world reinforces this suspicion.
Northeast Brazil is not renowned for its effective public institutions, or its developmental successes. Yet, in the late 1980s, the government of the state of Ceará instituted a public health program (Programa de Agentes de Saúde -PAS) that eventually managed to reach 850,000 families and played a role in tripling the coverage of vaccinations and reducing infant mortality by 36%. The program was incredibly "cost effective," requiring an investment of only US$2.00 per capita.
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The backbone of the program was comprised of roughly 7,000
unskilled "health agents" who were paid only the minimum wage. A good part of the secret of this program's success lay in its careful attention to the intangible aspects of building an effective public service. Creating esprit de corps and a sense of "calling" among the health agents played a key role in eliciting high levels of performance. They were made to feel that they were valued professionals, whose vital contribution to the welfare of their communities was recognized both by elite officials and the public at large. Even more important they are motifs with heuristically fruitful implications both for understanding the social roots of health-plus outcomes as well as for thinking about how to better integrate the institutional turn and the capability approach.
Lessons for Population Health and Development Theory
In the initial discussion of the "societal support index" two sorts of interpretations were invoked as possibilities. In the first, societal support Unfortunately for those that might try this defense, the institutional turn has already outgrown it. First, this minimalist version of the institutional turn leaves unexplained the origins of the institutions capable of predictably providing rules and infrastructure. Beyond that, having accepted the idea that "human development" is cause as well as consequence of income growth, the proponents of the institutional turn, 68 growth theorists must 67 There are exceptions, such as the use of "ethnic fractionalization", but the theoretical frame in which these are introduced assumes that non-economic identities are divisive and lead to "irrational" conflictive behavior. See Easterly, W. and R. Levine. 1997 face the necessity of providing institutional explanations for a range of outcomes that begins to rival the range considered by the capability approach.
There is, however, another, more specific, challenge posed to adherents to the institutional turn by the analyses offered here. It was pointed out earlier that a narrow institutional focus on "property rights" and other institutions closely tied to economic incentives is susceptible to slipping back into the simpler assumption that markets plus capital are sufficient for growth. Looking at the illustrative cases that have been considered here suggests that this devolution is not just a theoretical retreat, but unsustainable, even if development goals could be restricted to increased income.
Simple models of making markets work often involve trying to "depoliticize" allocational decisions. Yet, in the cases we have looked at
here, "depoliticizing" may precisely undercut the very social mechanisms that are necessary, not only to achieve broader development goals and synthesis. The preliminary forays offered here make clear the potential for building more satisfying cultural and institutional explanations of developmental outcomes that are central to capability expansion and also critical to economic growth. They support the idea that the full extension of the institutional turn in growth theory would also end up being a institutional-cultural theory of capability expansion. In an era in which development theory is so frequently condemned as being incapable of contributing to the well-being of ordinary citizens in the Global South, the possibility of such an integrated approach must be considered an exciting prospect.
